In total, United Russia won 82% of the seats in regional legislative assemblies, with the rest divided among the parties of the so-called ‘systemic opposition.’ United Russia proudly reported that, as a result of the recent elections, more than 800 participants in the war in Ukraine won seats in the legislature...
V. KARAMURZA: Hello! Welcome to the programme ‘Facets of the Week’ on the YouTube channel “Transit” and the media platform ‘Echo’. Vladimir Karamurza is at the microphone. Last weekend, Russia held its so-called ‘single voting day.’ I say ‘so-called’ not only because elections under the current regime have long since become a sham procedure, losing even the appearance of political competition, but also because the single day lasted three days – 12, 13 and 14 September.
Multi-day voting, along with electronic and courtyard voting, known as ‘stump voting,’ has long been used by Russian authorities to conveniently adjust results. According to official data, the authorities' candidates won all gubernatorial elections without exception in the first round, and the United Russia party took first place in all elections to regional parliaments and legislative bodies of regional capitals without exception. In total, United Russia won 82% of the seats in regional legislative assemblies, with the rest divided among the parties of the so-called ‘systemic opposition.’ United Russia proudly reported that more than 800 participants in the war in Ukraine won seats in the elections. The only anti-war party participating in these elections, Yabloko, managed to get on the ballot in 19 regions. All candidates on this party's list campaigned under the slogan ‘For peace and freedom, for a ceasefire agreement.’ According to official data, Yabloko's average result was 11%. The party managed to get its deputies elected in Kaluga and the Pskov region, but lost its faction in the Tomsk City Duma, where it fell just 0.14% short of the threshold. We discuss the results and lessons of the elections under dictatorship today with guests on the programme ‘Grani Nedeli’ (Facets of the Week).
The party managed to get its deputies elected in Kaluga and Pskov Oblast, but lost its faction in the Tomsk City Duma, where it fell just 0.14% short of the threshold. We discuss the results and lessons of elections under dictatorship today with guests on the programme ‘Grani Nedeli’ (Facets of the Week). Our guests are: Stanislav Andreychuk, electoral expert from 2020 to 2025, co-chair of the Golos movement for the protection of voters' rights, which, unfortunately, has now been dissolved... Stanislav, hello!
S. ANDREYCHUK: Hello!
V. KARAMURZA: Ksenia Fadeeva, member of the Tomsk City Duma of the 7th convocation from 2018 to 2021, coordinator of Alexei Navalny's campaign headquarters in Tomsk. Hello, Ksenia!
K. FADEEVA: Hello!
V. KARAMURZA: And Alexander Goncharenko, politician, human rights activist from 2008 to 2023, member of the federal bureau of the Yabloko party. Hello, Alexander!
A. GONCHARENKO: Hello!
V. KARAMURZA: Before we begin discussing the recent elections, Ksenia, I must ask you a question about the investigation into the murder of Alexei Navalny, the results of which were published this week. I would like to remind you that two Western laboratories independently confirmed what we all knew anyway, of course — that Alexei Navalny was poisoned in prison in February 2024. I can say that when I saw this publication with the investigation, saw the phot
o of the cell where Alexei died, where they left him to die on the floor, and the guards locked the door and watched through the peephole, my heart just pounded. Because it was exactly the same as the cell I was in at the PKT in Omsk, at IK-7 last year. I don't know, maybe they're all the same there. Ksenia, what is your reaction to this investigation? Let me remind you that last time, in 2020, Alexei Navalny was poisoned in Tomsk when he came on a pre-election trip just before the elections to the Tomsk Duma of the 7th convocation.
K. FADEEVA: To be honest, these images simply crushed me, probably, you could say, weighed me down, because, as you said, in general, yes, we understood everything, of course. We understood that Alexei had been killed, and we probably guessed that it was most likely poisoning. But when you read about his last hours and how, basically, people just like us, with two hands, two feet, a head on their shoulders, but in uniform and with epaulettes, just watched as a man like them writhed in pain on the floor and died, and then simply slammed those doors, the cameras, the bars, and left — well, I don't even know how to convey my feelings. And the photographs — it all makes a very heavy impression. It had to be done, and Navalny's team is, of course, right to investigate. I hope that sooner or later this will all be brought to a conclusion, and we will learn the names not only of the main instigator — whom we already know, of course — but also of all those who carried out the order. These were people who probably grew up reading the same books, with the same ideas about good and evil, who simply delivered this poison to the colony, mixed it into the food or, I don't know, applied it somewhere, who did not help a man dying in agony. And, of course, I want to believe that their names will be revealed and that sooner or later they will be punished.
V. KARAMURZA: They will all say later that they were just following orders. That's what criminals always say when they try to avoid punishment. But I just want to remind you that even in the Nuremberg Charter after the Second World War — Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter — it was clearly stated, in black and white, that carrying out a criminal order does not exempt the perpetrator from responsibility. I would also like to remind you that Article 277 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, ‘On the attempted murder of a state or public figure,’ has no statute of limitations. This applies to the murder of Boris Nemtsov, and it applies to the murder of Alexei Navalny. And I, Ksenia, agree with what you said: I too want to believe and am confident that the day will come when all the monsters, from the main Kremlin usurper to the last prison guard, will be held accountable for what they have done. Let's return to the topic of our programme — the recent regional elections.
Question for Stanislav Andreichuk. Let me remind you that until this summer, Stanislav was co-chair of the Golos voter rights movement. The movement ceased its activities due to ongoing repression against its members. I would like to mention today that one of the founders and co-chair of the Golos movement, Grigory Melkonyants, has been in prison for more than two years. This year, he received a five-year sentence for participating in a so-called ‘undesirable organisation,’ but in reality, as we all understand, for his honest, open and tireless work in conducting independent observation of elections in Russia. Stanislav, I will ask a question that many of our viewers and listeners are probably asking themselves right now: what are we even discussing? Is there any point in talking about the 2025 elections in Russia? Are there, or are there still, I don't know, at least some elements, at least some islands of political competition? Or is it roughly the same as if we were now discussing with serious faces the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, where the ‘unbreakable bloc of communists and non-party members’ won a total of 99.9% of the vote, and 98.5% in the Baltic republics?
S. ANDREYCHUK: Well, there is a point in discussing it in any case — the question is what we want to find out from it. First, there is competition in some places. It is clear that it is becoming more and more localised, with fewer and fewer places, but the lower the level of elections, the greater the competition. Because we see that, for example, in municipal elections for mayors of even some districts and small towns in Khakassia, Yakutia, and other regions, United Russia may lose, and someone else may win — independent candidates, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in some places, or someone else in others.
That is, at the local level, there is still competition, but it also depends very much on the region, on which part of the country we are in. But in fact, this is what is interesting. Because, of course, they are trying to create this image of unity, and what works for that? What works for that is control over the entire media sphere, that is, military censorship, in fact. Repression works for this. Because, forgive me, but candidates simply do not want to run. No one wants to run because why bother? No one wants to repeat the fate of Ksyusha Fadeeva, who is here with us now.
Because Ksenia was replaced, and it is unknown whether you will be replaced next time — there were no more replacements, you can get caught just like that. Right now, several candidates in different elections have won — one of them, you see, had a case brought against him literally a few days later (well, if it's just an administrative offence, fine, but they're charging him with some kind of extremism), another had a criminal case brought against him, and a third... People have just won — they haven't even had time to vote yet, no decisions have been made, but they are already considered outsiders and dangerous. That's why we see that over the last three years, no one wants to run for office. Competition is very low. Not because no one is registering, but because there is no competition at the nomination stage. And, accordingly, there are no campaigns, no competition, no observation — practically nothing. Therefore, of course, United Russia gets results of about 50% in elections where there is a list system. When we talk about the 80% of seats they won, we must understand that in most of our legislative assemblies, the list system is very small. The number of seats allocated according to lists is very small. The majority are single-member constituencies. And in single-member constituencies, United Russia almost always wins because, again, there is no competition. That is where these 80% of seats come from.
Wherever competition suddenly appears, the ‘ruling party’ encounters problems. And this, in fact, is what we must take into account, in my opinion, when we talk about the state of society. Because, in fact, apart from these elections, we have nothing else that allows us to learn about the state of society, about what people think. We don't understand how sociology works, we have virtually no media, and there is no feedback. You can only talk within your own bubble, so you only see the reactions of the people who are directly around you. We don't know what people think in general. It's only when we look at the elections — at the results, at how the campaign is being conducted... Because, for example, the topic of military action is almost nowhere to be found — that's also a certain indicator. It's only from elections that we can learn and gain something about the state of society. That's why I think we still need to follow them. Another thing is that it's very difficult, especially when there are regional and municipal elections scattered throughout the country.
V. KARAMURZA: We therefore understand perfectly well that this is still a very distorted picture — and that is putting it mildly, diplomatically speaking. For example, I mentioned that the average result for candidates from Yabloko, the only anti-war party in these elections, was 11%. We all understand that there are far more than 11% of people in Russia who oppose the war. Therefore, when we say that this gives us something, some information about the state of society, it is clear that the picture is very distorted. I would like to quote what Nikolai Rybakov, the chairman of the Yabloko party, said after the last elections. I quote: "In 2025, a large campaign called “For Peace” took place in Russia, in which hundreds of candidates and thousands of citizens participated. Many had to overcome their fears to do so, because everyone knows about persecution for one's beliefs in our country. But we showed that there are many people in Russia who are fighting to stop people from dying." End of quote.
Question to Alexander Goncharenko, member of the Yabloko party and former member of the federal bureau: how do you assess the results of this campaign for the only anti-war party in Russia? A. GONCHARENKO: Well, I wouldn't directly correlate the results of the Yabloko party with support for the anti-war thesis. And here's why. First, as Stanislav already said, these elections were regional in scope, and voters who usually vote for democratic parties, including Yabloko, understand at what level issues of peace and war are decided, and turnout was low. But at the same time, I would say that it is good that there is a legal anti-war democratic party in Russia. This means that anti-war candidates have the opportunity to run for office. And secondly, it means that voters who oppose the war have someone to vote for. This is especially true in view of the fact that next year there will be elections to the State Duma, and these will be either the first elections during wartime or, at best, in the post-war period, but they will be significantly different from the elections that took place in 2021. And there is a real demand for this in society. And the presidential elections — we all saw the queues at Nadezhdin's campaign headquarters. This shows that there are people in society who are ready to vote against the war. And I emphasise once again: it is good that Russia still has a legal party that is bringing this agenda to the masses.
V. KARAMURZA: I think that the authorities themselves understand perfectly well how many people in Russia actually oppose the war and are ready to vote against it. That is precisely why even a moderate and cautious politician like Boris Nadezhdin was not allowed to run in last year's presidential election. Because yes, Alexander Goncharenko is absolutely right: the whole world saw those huge queues at his campaign offices across the country when people had their first opportunity to legally and publicly speak out against the war, and they took advantage of that opportunity. Ksenia, I want to ask you directly about the elections in Tomsk. There is a very big contrast between what we saw five years ago after your election victory and the victories of many of your colleagues. At that time, you were on the same programme with me on the Echo of Moscow radio station. In the last convocation, if I am not mistaken, United Russia had only 11 seats out of 37 in the Tomsk City Duma, and it represented a whole range of political views — something that is very rare in Russia today. There was Yabloko, there were Navalny's headquarters, and there were other opposition forces.
The situation in Tomsk is now similar to what we see throughout the rest of the country. United Russia has an overwhelming majority in the new City Duma: according to official data, it won 26 and 27 single-mandate constituencies and gained almost 43% of the vote on the party list. And, in fact, United Russia now has an overwhelming majority — 31 out of 37 seats, compared to 11 in the previous convocation. In your opinion, what caused such a big difference in just five years in how the residents of Tomsk voted in the elections?
K. FADEEVA: Well, I think it's very simple. In the last election, the ‘party in power’ and the administration in general, the regional administration, which probably controlled the electoral process to a greater extent, underestimated the opposition as a whole — well, us, of course, Navalny's headquarters, ‘Smart Voting’, — and, in general, by mistake, out of stupidity, they registered us and allowed us to participate in the elections.
And then, of course, there was Alexei's visit, the investigative film and his poisoning in Tomsk, after which, in fact, the investigative film about the Tomsk United Russia party was watched by a total of 6 million people, and in Tomsk, I think, everyone watched it... Well, maybe not everyone, but the vast majority of people who are at least somewhat interested in politics. And then our registrations on Smart Voting just skyrocketed. Before the film, there were 3,000 people signed up and planning to use the recommendation, but after the video was released, there were 11,000 people. And, of course, that played a huge role. The opposition was then able to mobilise its electorate, and people came and voted for us. For different ‘us’ — not only for me and my colleague Andrey from the headquarters, Andrey Fateev, but also for Yabloko and for independent candidates. And, by the way, it is also interesting that there were three independent candidates in these elections, one of whom was not registered — on what I consider to be a trumped-up pretext: because of the width of the lines in the signature sheets — whereas five years ago there were 21 independent candidates.
And this, of course, also speaks volumes, I think, about the state of society: people were not afraid to go to the polls. Well, yes, of course, it was 2020. I don't want to say that there was complete democracy and freedom of speech in Russia, but at least the opposition was not criminalised, and it was possible to openly express one's opinion — at least during the elections. And we did not hide our affiliation with the campaign headquarters either. My campaign cubes and leaflets said that I was the coordinator of Navalny's campaign headquarters, and we also used the federal agenda in our campaigning: we talked about corruption, about how cities in Russia in general and Tomsk in particular are poor, with broken roads and old trams, because billions and billions of money go into the pockets of the president's friends, go to the special services, the army, the security forces and so on. And we could talk about it openly. Now it is very difficult to mobilise the opposition and people solely on the basis of some municipal or local agenda. Local elections, unfortunately, are not always of great interest to the population. And if last time the turnout was something like 19 per cent, now it is 18 per cent. So, the difference seems small. But United Russia, of course, mobilised state employees through the DEG, remote voting, and mobilised its electorate in general. Well, for the opposition, in conditions that are, in general, already a dictatorship, it is, of course, very difficult to do this.
And here, I think, we should once again note the courage of the Yabloko party and those people who left Yabloko. Billboards with the slogan ‘For peace and freedom!’ were literally everywhere. And I think that in 2025, this is worthy of respect.
V. KARA-MURZA: Yes, I completely agree with what you said. A few days before the election, we even wrote on Facebook that — and I will quote directly — ‘based on the party lists, I would definitely vote for Yabloko.’ I believe that a party that is running in 2025 with the slogan “For peace and freedom” is worthy of support." I completely agree with you here, and I regret that not all, let's say, representatives of the Russian opposition, including those in exile, have taken this position. Ksenia, I would also like to ask you to comment on one specific result. At the polling station in the Akademgorodok district of Tomsk — that is, Tomsk University, your alma mater — Yabloko's result this year is three times higher than it was five years ago: almost 30%. How do you explain this change?
K. FADEEVA: The Akademgorodok area is not part of the university campus. To be honest, I didn't pay any attention to that area myself. I can't say. Perhaps the Yabloko candidate ran a particularly effective campaign there. Because last time, in one of the constituencies in 2020, Yabloko, as a party, gained a lot of votes, that is, specifically in terms of the list, in the constituency where the opposition candidate literally visited every flat and every stairwell. And this always brings votes to the party, of course, even if the person is running as an independent, but it also brings votes to the party. So perhaps there was a very active Yabloko member in that district.
V. KARA-MURZA: Question for Stanislav Andreichuk. In this grey realm of no alternatives and authoritarianism in which we find ourselves, are there nevertheless any stories and results, perhaps local ones, from this past single voting day that you would draw attention to — something that might be of interest?
S. ANDREYCHUK: Well, look, if we are talking about municipal and regional campaigns, we must always remember that party affiliation means very little at this level. Because, in general, we don't really have any parties as such. People switch from party to party, joining one or the other, just to have the opportunity to participate in elections. That's why some perfectly decent people may be in the Communist Party, some in the Liberal Democratic Party, and some elsewhere. In some places, it's just a matter of personal connections. As Ksenia just said, one particular person went to every apartment in the district, and the party's results skyrocketed there. It's important to understand how local elections work: turnout is always very low. What is 20% of the number of voters in the district? That's a couple of thousand people. Accordingly, going around one extra apartment building — going around one apartment building can radically change the results of the election: a person can simply win if they go around one more building. So, of course, there are still these stories. I have already mentioned that, for example, in Yakutia, United Russia lost the mayoral elections in several districts at once. In Khakassia, in the city of Chernogorsk, a candidate from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation became mayor, winning... Well, Khakassia in general... We have a struggle between United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Fair Russia party, because the governor is from the Communist Party and is quite oppositional in this sense — well, at the regional level. Somewhere in the Pskov region, Yabloko was gaining ground. But overall, it is important to understand — I just want to emphasise this again — that if you don't have candidates, you won't have any success stories. And there are very few candidates. We are talking about Yabloko, but Yabloko nominated about 250-300 people in these elections across the country. And a total of 100,000 candidates were nominated in all elections. Well, that is...
V. KARAMURZA: Moreover, only 164 of them were registered and made it through...
S. ANDREYCHUK: Yes, yes. Just imagine how small a proportion that is. And this is not just about Yabloko. Because if we look at the other parliamentary parties... With the exception of United Russia. It is clear that United Russia fields candidates for virtually all seats. But neither the Communist Party, nor the Liberal Democratic Party, nor Fair Russia, nor, even less so, New People — they also hardly participate in elections at the local level. There are simply no people to nominate. So what are we waiting for? Why are we waiting for some other results? How, in these circumstances, can United Russia get less than 50%, relatively speaking, if it participates and there are simply no others? And so I will repeat myself: where there were pockets of competition, there was intrigue. There were 50-50, 51-49, 52-48 results. It's just that these pockets of competition are becoming fewer and fewer. Because, again, it's not clear what the point is. It is unclear why people should take risks. If you have political ambitions, then in these conditions you simply try to realise them in a different way.
V. KARAMURZA: Alexander, to what extent do the ongoing repressions in our country against people with anti-war views affect Yabloko's ability to participate in the elections? They affect what Stanislav said — that there are simply not enough candidates. People don't want to, aren't ready, are afraid — I don't know how else to describe it — to run in these elections. With an obviously anti-war stance, I repeat, all Yabloko candidates are participating in these elections under the slogan ‘For peace and freedom.’ I would like to remind our viewers and listeners that a criminal case has been brought against Alexander Goncharenko himself in absentia for so-called ‘discrediting the army’, and in Russia, several representatives of the Yabloko party, including the party's deputy chairman Lev Shlosberg, are currently either in prison or under house arrest specifically for criminal cases related to their anti-war stance. How much did this affect the scale of, let's say, Yabloko's participation in the last elections, which, as Stanislav just said, compared to the country as a whole...
A. GONCHARENKO: This applies not only to party members. I have a list of about 10 people in the Altai Krai who are currently behind bars for political reasons. So, of course, the general situation has an impact. Nowadays, you can't approach things from the same perspective as in the pre-war period. People don't want to participate now; it's dangerous for them to participate in elections, and it's also quite difficult to put together a team. It was difficult five years ago, and six years ago it was already difficult when we had to have a team of at least 50-60, or even 70 people, just to formally run in the regional legislative assembly elections. Can you imagine how difficult it is to assemble such a team when, at best, you could count on 1-2 seats? That is why this is of enormous importance now. But I will repeat myself and say that we must now consider the situation in the run-up to the elections, which will take place in a year's time. Only those elections can truly answer the question of what the position is and whether there is demand for an anti-war agenda. There is, and Yabloko's task will be to consolidate these voters — about 15-20 million in Russia. These are the ones who were against it from the outset.
For two years, we have been running a project in Germany to support victims of the war in Ukraine. We provide psychological support to refugees from Ukraine – largely thanks, of course, to the Hamburg Foundation for Politically Persecuted Persons and its executive director, Martina Baeurle. But what is it that I want to say? I know first-hand the magnitude of the tragedy that Russian aggression has brought to Ukrainian soil, and at the same time I understand how important it is that Ukraine is resisting and is capable of resisting — how important it is for those Russians who were initially opposed to the war. And that is why, in my opinion, the elections cannot be viewed from a municipal level perspective and so on. In Russia, the upcoming State Duma elections will be of decisive importance.
V. KARAMURZA: Let's talk about the upcoming elections to the State Duma. The recent so-called ‘single voting day’ was, in fact, the last electoral event before the elections of deputies to the State Duma of the 9th convocation, which will take place in September next year. In fact, there is exactly one year left until then. Ksenia, in your opinion, what should be the tactics and strategy of the Russian opposition in this upcoming vote in September 2026? Given that everyone understands perfectly well that it will have nothing to do with competitive elections. What, in your opinion, should the protest strategy be? How can even such fake, unfree, non-competitive elections be used to show that there are many people in Russia who disagree with the course pursued by the current regime, both inside the country and beyond its borders?
K. FADEEVA: Well, I would like to express my cautious hope that perhaps the Russian opposition will be able to reach an agreement — I am not saying ‘unite,’ but rather reach an agreement and develop a single strategy. What could that be? Perhaps it will be support for the Yabloko party, that is, simply a call from the entire opposition, which is in exile abroad, to vote for this party. Perhaps it will be a strategy of ‘vote for any party except United Russia.’ Although, to be honest, from my point of view, this strategy does not seem to make much sense at the moment, because, in fact, all the parliamentary parties supported the war. That is, they may still differ from each other in some ways, and they probably differ in particular when we talk about specific candidates in the regions, but at the federal level... Well, the New People have a beautiful turquoise colour in their logos, and they are all so creative and fashionable, but, to be honest, they supported the same things that United Russia supported.
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V. KARAMURZA: Once again, Ksenia, I completely agree with you. I believe that in the current situation in Russia, a party that is running for election under the slogan ‘For peace and freedom’ undoubtedly deserves the support of all decent people who oppose this war, regardless of any other complaints that might be levelled at this party.
K. FADEEVA: Well, in terms of its anti-war agenda, the Yabloko party also supports political prisoners and speaks publicly about them. For example, when I myself was in prison, I received a lot of letters, including from evenings in support of political prisoners organised by the Yabloko party. Neither the new people, nor the Communist Party, nor Fair Russia, God forgive me — I won't even mention the Liberal Democratic Party — they don't raise this issue at all, unlike Yabloko. I think that in today's situation this is also extremely important, and for this reason alone Yabloko deserves support.
V. KARA-MURZA: I can also speak on a personal level about how important this moral support was, these letters, these postcards, which I, like you, Ksenia, received from all over the country, even from some truly exotic corners—these letters and postcards from evenings for political prisoners, held by regional Yabloko branches. And when I had trials, including in Omsk itself—there was a foreign agency case and so on—every time the entire Omsk Yabloko branch came, again, to offer moral support. And I know that Yabloko continues to provide significant support, both moral and practical, by holding auctions in support of political prisoners and their families. And indeed, the importance of such activities in today's Putin-era Russia, in the fourth year of the Great War, is probably very difficult to overestimate. A whole year remains until the so-called elections. For now, as of September 2025, Yabloko retains the so-called parliamentary privilege, which allows the party to participate in the State Duma elections without collecting signatures. Specifically, this means factions in the regional parliaments of St. Petersburg, Karelia, and the Pskov region. But, again, a lot of water could still pass under the bridge in a year—we'll see where we end up in September 2026.
Stanislav, speaking of the upcoming State Duma elections, I wanted to ask you about the possibilities (if any) for independent public observation of the elections. Let me first read a quote—this is about the recent regional elections last weekend: "These elections are ensured by an unprecedented level of public oversight. There are approximately 165,000 observers representing candidates, political parties, and public figures at the polling stations." End of quote. This is a statement by Alexander Brod, a member of the Presidential Council for Human Rights. Well, this man has long been known for his servile statements in support of everything the Russian government does. "An unprecedented level of public scrutiny"...
Now, returning from the world of George Orwell and Franz Kafka to our reality: Stanislav, are there any other opportunities for independent public monitoring in Russia today? Well, in my opinion, your organization—first the Golos Association, then the Golos movement—has been the gold standard for such monitoring in recent years. But, as I mentioned at the beginning of the program, the Golos movement announced the end of its activities last summer due to ongoing repression against independent observers, primarily due to the five-year prison sentence handed down to Grigory Melkonyants, one of Golos's founders, for his election observation work. Are there any opportunities today for Russian citizens and public organizations to ensure even a semblance of independent monitoring during the 2026 elections?
S. ANDREYCHUK: Well, look, we need to understand what independent monitoring is, what we mean by it. Because, by law, observers can be sent by candidates, parties, and public chambers. Public chambers, of course, are a completely state structure; we don't even need to talk about them. So, we're left with candidates and parties. In this sense, strictly public monitoring doesn't exist. Another question is whether people with independent views can become observers. And in this sense, everything will depend on the level of competition, real competition. There will be candidates who will genuinely fight for mandates, and there will be observers. It doesn't matter whether they'll be independent, or they'll be party members—any kind. If there are no candidates, there won't be observers. In this sense, observation is a bit secondary in the sense that without competition, it's meaningless and impossible. Therefore, we—well, observers, I mean—are very dependent on which candidates and which parties are participating in the elections and, most importantly, how they participate. Because you can participate formally, or you can participate for real. If you participate for real, if you're truly fighting for power, then you need people at the polling stations. And you don't even care about their political views anymore—you just care about them observing. Who they are isn't that important. What matters is that your polling stations are closed. Many people say about the electronic voting system (DEV) that it's impossible to observe in the era of electronic voting. But that's not entirely true. Because, well, there is the Moscow DEV—in Moscow, all voting is indeed electronic, so you can't really monitor Moscow very closely. And Moscow is a big place, with 7 million voters, about 7% of the total electorate.
V. KARA-MURZA: And with a traditionally high protest vote, I'd add.
S. ANDREYCHUK: Well, initially with a protest vote, now thanks to the Election Commission, it's turning out to be very pro-government. But in other regions...
V. KARA-MURZA: But it's not how they vote, but how they count, as we know. S. ANDREYCHUK: Well, yes, in a sense, yes. But other regions have a different Election Commission system. Firstly, it's not in all regions. This year, there were elections in 81 regions—the Election Commission was in 24. V. KARA-MURZA: Ms. Pamfilova said that out of the 16 million voters who took part, 1.5 million voted electronically, that is, less than 10%.
S. ANDREYCHUK: Yes, that's out of the 16 million who were in regions where the Election Commission, again, most likely, was in place. That is, we need to understand how exactly they calculate it. But in reality, the DEG isn't in all regions. And secondly, in these regions, a minority votes in the DEG. And the higher the turnout, the smaller the DEG's share. Well, if we look at the formal election results, then in this campaign, and last year's, the federal DEG, not the Moscow DEG, didn't differ much from the polling station results. That doesn't mean it can't differ, it doesn't mean it can't be rigged at some point, but it doesn't seem to have any noticeable impact on the result—well, not any significant one. Therefore, the DEG is less to be feared than, say, a three-day vote, but you can still try to monitor both. Well, at least some information will emerge, some scandals. And scandals themselves are also a certain deterrent. For example, if a scandal broke out in one polling station on Friday, it'll likely be quieter on Saturday and Sunday. So, it makes sense to monitor. But then again, monitoring only makes sense if there's a fight. And if there's no fight, who's going to go to a football match where a professional team is playing against a 5-year-old neighborhood team? No one's interested.
V. KARA-MURZA: Alexander Goncharenko, a question for you. What's the mood among your Yabloko colleagues? Do you think Yabloko will run in the so-called parliamentary elections in 2026 with the same anti-war stance it's held for the past three and a half years, with the same slogan, "For Peace and Freedom"? And given Boris Nadezhdin's experience last year, do you think there's any chance at all that with this stance, Yabloko could get on the ballot in 2026, so that millions of Russian citizens, tens of millions, would have, as you said at the beginning of the program, the legal opportunity to vote against this war?
A. GONCHARENKO: I would say that Yabloko's title as an anti-war party obliges it. And that's one point. Second: unlike the presidential elections, where Nadezhdin had to collect signatures and defend them, Yabloko has three factions, as you already mentioned, Vladimir, in order to avoid the signature collection process.
V. KARA-MURZA: That's if they don't change the rules in the remaining year.
A. GONCHARENKO: Yes, yes, yes. Well, it's well known that the Russian government plays against the rules, not by them—that's long been known. But, generally speaking, a party has to do something if it's aiming for such a lofty title in such difficult times as the anti-war party. And if the party is truly consistent and can attract all anti-war voters, then there's a definite chance. Moreover, if the opposition abroad doesn't play tricks, building castles in the air, representing either "New People" or someone else, hoping that once they become the authorities and gain a large number of votes, they will become a competitor to both the president and United Russia. Today, the situation is different. These elections offer an opportunity to show the authorities that there are people in Russia who don't share their position on the most important issue—war and peace. So, as the saying goes, hope dies last.
V. KARA-MURZA: It seems to me, Alexander—referring to what you said—that boycotting is probably the fashionable position among a significant part of the Russian opposition abroad. And in general, I think many of those watching and listening to our program are probably wincing, some are smirking, and probably wondering: what are they even talking about? What kind of elections can there be under a dictatorship? And elections under a dictatorship really cannot exist, and I think everyone here understands that very well. But, for example, my personal position has always been that even rigged, even patently unfair and unfree elections still, in one form or another, give every person and citizen the opportunity to express their personal position, their personal attitude. I'll never forget: many years ago, I was in the Cologne Gestapo Museum in Germany, and among the exhibits there was a ballot from one of the many plebiscites of the 1930s on support and confidence in the Führer. And on this ballot was written "Nein"—"No." And so, I remember standing in this museum hall, looking at this ballot, and thinking that this person who voted with this ballot—he or she, perhaps (not perhaps, but unfortunately), was unable to change the course of history. But at least this person expressed, very clearly expressed, their personal position on the crimes that dictators so love to commit in the name of the entire people. In both Bukovsky and Solzhenitsyn, we read about people who were imprisoned in Soviet prisons and camps for writing anti-Soviet slogans on ballots during the so-called Soviet elections. This was quite strictly monitored and prosecuted. Therefore, I will reiterate my position: even such rigged, unfree elections can be used to express one's attitude toward what is happening. But, Ksenia, I want to ask you: how do you respond to those who call for a boycott, for non-participation, who say that... Well, we know all these phrases about playing with cheaters and so on. You have already expressed your position that, in your view, participation is still necessary even in the current situation. How will you respond to those who advocate a boycott?
K. FADEEVA: Well, look, yes, many people have left Russia for political reasons. Some were even forcibly flown out. But most people stayed. More than 100 million people live in Russia, 140 million. And people with an anti-war stance, people with an anti-Putin stance, now have no other way to express their position—pardon the tautology—their point of view without going to jail, other than to go to the polls. While five years ago, rallies and pickets were possible—yes, they weren't always approved, but the worst thing that could happen was a 15-30-day prison sentence or a fine—now, a solitary picket can land you in jail for ten years or more. Therefore, I think it's important now to encourage people to express their point of view in ways that don't threaten them with jail time. I think we're no longer in that situation. The war is in its fourth year, the number of political prisoners already numbers in the thousands, and we're not in a situation where we can argue that this is a game with a cheat, everything is a foregone conclusion, and so on. Well, let's not fall before the shot is fired, and do what we can, and encourage people to participate safely while we can. Well, that's my position right now.
V. KARA-MURZA: Stanislav, please tell us some recent news on the case of Grigory Melkonyants. Let me remind you: one of the founders and, until this year, co-chairman of the Golos movement, has been in prison for three years precisely because he honestly and consistently worked for many years to organize independent election monitoring in Russia. What's been heard about his case lately?
S. ANDREYCHUK: I'll talk about Grisha now, but I'd like to add a little about the cheaters' game.
V. KARA-MURZA: Of course.
S. ANDREYCHUK: I think this is a very interesting analogy. Do you understand why you can't play with a cheat? Because you can lose money. Well, you can lose everything—all your property... And this doesn't work with elections, because what can you lose when you go to the polls? Well, you'll waste a little time. V. KARA-MURZA: Not that bad.
S. ANDREYCHUK: Well, yes, there are no real losses. And so on Sundays, we often don't know what to do. A huge number of people don't know what to do. There are no losses. That is, you won't lose, you might win something. If you don't go to the polls, you won't really lose anything either, but you won't have a chance to express your position. In reality, a boycott is invisible; no one sees it. So it's up to you to decide. There's a small chance. Imagine you have a no-lose lottery: you can choose not to scrape off this protective field, not to see if you're winning or not, or you can scrape it off. There's no loss in either. So decide for yourself whether to take the chance or not.
V. KARA-MURZA: Sorry to interrupt, Stanislav. Well, this is, again, my personal position that people who can't even spare that half hour on Sunday you mentioned—well, it turns out they're already agreeing with everything that's happening. Because if someone can't go out and express their position, even in such a legal, safe manner... Well, silence is a sign of consent in that case. So, I'll repeat myself: we know of numerous examples in dictatorial regimes, the most terrible dictatorial regimes, like Hitler's and Stalin's, where people used these sham electoral procedures to come and express their position against these regimes anyway, and often people ended up in prison for it.
S. ANDREYCHUK: Well, there's no point in complaining after that. At least, that's what I think. As for Grigory, Grigory is currently in Komi, and his sentence hasn't yet come into effect. Moreover, the sentence was handed down in May, the reasoning for the decision was prepared in mid-June, but he still hasn't been informed of it. That is, he hasn't even filed an appeal yet. And when will... Well, he should be informed, he'll file an appeal, then a hearing date will be set, and only after that will the sentence either come into effect or not. So, there's nothing particularly new. He's in Komi, he's not complaining about anything, he seems to be feeling well, as well as it's possible to feel in such conditions. But he writes rather optimistic letters to everyone, saying: everything's fine, guys, thanks for the support, thanks for writing. He confided that in one of the pretrial detention centers they called him "Lenin." Because they constantly write him tons of letters, and he constantly writes, that's why they call him Lenin.
V. KARA-MURZA: He writes between the lines with milk? Like, remember, in Zoshchenko's story, which... Well, Ksenia is too young, and the rest of us who lived through Soviet school remember that idiotic story well—how Lenin wrote between the lines with milk in prison.
S. ANDREYCHUK: Well, that won't work now. Most of the correspondence is electronic, and the milk won't show through there, even if you try really hard. But, nevertheless, of course, it's very supportive. So write, don't forget—not just to Grigory, but to all political prisoners. It's truly, truly important for them to feel supported, to feel like people are remembering you, thinking about you, and so on. I'd love to write more often about what's happening with Grigory, but practically nothing is happening. That might be the problem, or maybe it's a blessing—it's hard to know what's best in our current reality. So for now, this is it: a temporary lull, waiting for the appeal.
V. KARA-MURZA: Irwin Cotler, a renowned human rights activist and lawyer who once represented Nelson Mandela, Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly Shcharansky, and other dissidents and prisoners of conscience, once wrote that the worst thing for a political prisoner is to be forgotten. I can say from personal experience that this is truly true, and that this moral support is extremely important. I'm sure Ksenia would agree with me. My favorite time of day was around 4 p.m., when the guard hands me a stack of letters through the feeding trench. And there's so much light, so much warmth, so much hope on those sheets of paper! Perhaps only those who have personally gone through this experience can truly appreciate it. So I simply want to echo what Stanislav Andreychuk said: write to Grigory Melkonyants, write to political prisoners, it's very important. Alexander, my question is again about the upcoming State Duma elections next year. How likely is it that at least some part of the Russian democratic opposition in exile will take the position described by Ksenia Fadeeva and, despite all the possible questions and complaints, call on Russian citizens to support the Yabloko party as the only anti-war party on the ballot? Do you think such a possibility exists, or is it something out of the realm of fantasy, given everything we know about the activities and functioning of the Russian opposition in exile?
A. GONCHARENKO: Well, of course, it's sad to watch the Russian opposition abroad. I don't know if you remember the film "The Crown of the Russian Empire," but it reminds me of something.
V. KARA-MURZA: Well, of course, where there were two tsars. Where two tsars were different.
A. GONCHARENKO: Yes. Nevertheless, this is the only chance. We must work together, both those in the opposition in Russia and those abroad, to create opportunities for voters—for those, as Ksenia already said, who want to express themselves, to show their thumbs up to the authorities. But they have one legal option: to go to the polls. There are simply no other legal options left in Russia without falling victim to repression. Therefore, we must work together, both those who remained in Russia and those who left, to somehow find common ground. That is, to accept it as a given—that there is only one legal party in Russia. Well, that's how the situation developed, that's what happened, so what now? There's no other chance that a second party will emerge today... better, worse. ...it's retreating to second, third, fourth place.
V. KARA-MURZA: Our program is coming to an end, so I'd like to quickly ask all our guests the same question: do you believe that we'll ever see normal, free, democratic, competitive elections in Russia? Stanislav Andreychuk.
S. ANDREYCHUK: "Keep your head in hell and don't despair." I think there's a chance. Many countries have been through this. And a little bit of it depends on us, but it also depends on each person, proportionally, depending on their strengths and capabilities. But, overall, I think there's every chance. We just need to keep rowing in that direction, and keep raking it out.
V. KARA-MURZA: Alexander Goncharenko, the same question for you.
A. GONCHARENKO: Well, I'd put it this way. My teachers, human rights activists Lyudmila Mikhailovna Alekseyeva, Sergei Adamovich Kovalev, and the still-living Valery Vasilyevich Borshchev, told me that back when they were engaged in anti-Soviet activities, the first toast was "let's drink to our hopeless cause." So I hope that this hopeless cause, fair elections in Russia, will one day come, and I'll see it all with my own eyes. I really want that.
V. KARA-MURZA: Indeed, the favorite dissident toast was "To the success of our hopeless cause." But, as we know well from our history, the cause turned out to be far from as hopeless as it might have seemed back in, I don't know, the late 1970s and early 1980s. Ksenia, the last word is yours.
K. FADEEVA: Well, I'm an optimist. Historically, I have no doubt that everything will be fine in Russia. And I think that in Russia there's already a huge demand for change—well, even banal ones, for peace, for freedom, simply for a normal, calm, happy life, in which Russians, just like residents of other European and other Western countries, can simply, I don't know, raise their children, travel, earn money, and not die on foreign soil. And so I have no doubt that we'll get there sooner or later. We just really need to move in that direction, and if we can't walk, we have to crawl. It may not happen as quickly as we'd all like, but I'm confident that we'll all experience normal elections in Russia in our lifetimes, participating both as voters and, perhaps, as candidates, if we so choose. Therefore, I'm confident that, historically, truth is on our side, and we'll all definitely live to see it.
V. KARA-MURZA: Let me remind you of the title of a wonderful book by sociologist Alexei Yurchak—a book about the late years of Soviet power, the late 1980s—"It Was Forever, Until It Ended." There has never been a dictatorship in history that didn't end. You watched and listened to the program "Facets of the Week" on the Transit YouTube channel and the Echo media platform. The program's producer was Irina Babloyan, director Dmitry Andreyev, and channel editor Semyon Sorkin. Vladimir Kara-Murza was at the microphone. Thank you for joining us today. All the best and see you on the next broadcast!
